Since all properties have content, a haecceity has content, which is the individuality or identity of the entity whose haecceity it is. This, however, does not mean that a haecceity is identical with that of which it is the haecceity. This is evident in the case of the haecceity of a concrete entity, since all haecceities, being properties, are abstract, and no concrete entity is abstract. Concrete entities, however, are not the only entities that have haecceities. Every entity, whether abstract (...) or concrete, has a haecceity. No entity, however, is identical with its haecceity. The abstract entity Redness, like the concrete entity Socrates, cannot be identical with its haecceity. Just as Socrates is not identical with the property of being identical with Socrates, so also Redness is not identical with the property of being identical with Redness. (shrink)

This extended essay presents the meditations of an eminent scholar on medieval philosophical theology. Beginning with a discussion of faith and reason, Ramon M. Lemos argues that we can be practically justified in accepting certain religions even though we may not know that their central claims are true. Lemos moves on to his operational definition of God, based on St. Anselm's concept of God as a being that which no greater can be conceived. From this ground, he considers (...) various medieval arguments for the existence of God and refutes the ability of the major arguments to succeed in demonstrating God's existence. He concludes that it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of God philosophically. This provocative book addresses the fundamental issues in the philosophy of religion—from a Christian perspective—while maintaining the necessary intellectual distance between revealed theology and philosophy. (shrink)

I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one’s justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one’s justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because these views imply that (...) many of us do not know epistemic propositions that we do know. This point is made by Roderick Chisholm in The Problem of the Criterion and challenged by Robert Amico. I consider Chisholm’s arguments and Amico’s objections. Finally, I argue that even if we reject DPJ and methodism, we need not embrace particularism, since we could reject both DPJ and DGP. (shrink)

Some philosophers have adopted both a commonsense approach to the theory of knowledge and held that some epistemic principles are knowable a priori. Roderick Chisholm is a prominent example of a philosopher who does both. In The Problem of the Criterion, Chisholm holds that in attempting to discover criteria of evidence we should begin with particular commonsense examples of knowledge, such as I know that I have two hands and I know that there are other people. According to Chisholm, our (...) knowledge of these particular epistemic facts does not depend upon our knowing criteria of evidence or knowledge. Moreover, we may reject various criteria of evidence and knowledge because they do not fit with these particular epistemic facts. Thus, according to Chisholm, we may reject the empiricist criterion of knowledge held by Locke and Hume because it implies that we do not know things that we do in fact know, because it conflicts with our commonsense epistemic beliefs. (shrink)

There is a long tradition in moral philosophy which maintains that a necessary condition for moral goodness is that one act from a sense of duty. Kant is perhaps the best known and most discussed representative of this view, but one finds others prior to Kant, such as Butler and Price, and Kant's contemporaries, such as Reid, expressing similar ideas. Price, for example writes, ". . . what I have chiefly insisted on, is, that we characterize as virtuous no actions (...) flowing merely from instinctive desires, or from any principle except a regard to virtue itself.'' In this paper, I shall defend a version of this thesis. (shrink)

The relativist contends that one has a duty to do something if and only if one's society holds that one does. The subjectivist maintains that one has a duty to do something if and only if one believes that one does. The objectivist argues that men have objective duties which are sometimes independent of what either they or their societies believe they are. My object is to indicate what seem to be some obvious, Yet fatal, Objections to relativism and subjectivism, (...) And to show how objectivists can take account of certain of the insights of relativists and subjectivists. I seek to show that relativists and subjectivists misunderstand the import of their insights, And that it is because of this that they suppose that these insights provide support for relativism or subjectivism when in fact they do not, And can be, Indeed need to be, Incorporated into a sound objectivist position. (shrink)